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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3125
___________
MARGARITA MICHULENA
                Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                            Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A79 312 178)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 26, 2010
Before:   AMBRO, CHAGARES AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : May 27, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Margarita Michulena, a citizen of Latvia, was admitted to the United States on
October 22, 1998, as a non-immigrant student.  She overstayed her admission period and
      Although Michulena filed her asylum application more than a year after she arrived1
in the United States, the IJ found that it was timely “[b]y stipulation of the Department of
(continued...)
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was charged with removability pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
§ 237(a)(1)(B) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)].  Michulena conceded removability but applied
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming that she was persecuted based on her sexual
orientation as a lesbian.  
Michulena claimed that she married her first husband in 1990, but that the
relationship ended after they had lived together for approximately one year.  In 1996,
Michulena began a relationship with Viktorija Timonina.  Over the next two years, the
couple was victimized by physical attacks, harassment, and vandalism.  Michulena and
Timonina traveled separately to the United States and, once here, began living together. 
Timonina’s asylum application was granted in September 2002.  In November 2002,
however, the couple broke up and Michulena started dating Alex Vargas, a United States
citizen.  Michulena married Vargas, although he later filed an affidavit with immigration
authorities asserting that the marriage was not bona fide.  Shortly thereafter, Michulena
resumed her relationship with Timonina.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found that Michulena was not credible, noting that
her account contained numerous inconsistencies and was not adequately supplemented
with documentary evidence.   The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) concluded the1
     (...continued)1
Homeland Security.”
      The provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005 that address our review of an adverse2
credibility finding do not apply in this case because Michulena applied for relief before
the Act’s effective date.  See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).
3
IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous.  Michulena filed a timely
petition for review of the denial of her asylum claim.  Because she does not challenge the
denial of withholding of removal or relief under the CAT, we deem those arguments
waived.  See Bradley v. Att’y Gen., No. 08-4184 , __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 1610597, at *6
n.8 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2010) (holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived).
“[W]hen the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the
bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and
the BIA.”  Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  Our review of these
decisions is for substantial evidence, considering whether they are “supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”
Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal citation
omitted).  We will uphold an adverse credibility determination under the substantial
evidence standard “‘unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.’”  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citation
omitted).  Adverse credibility determinations based on speculation or conjecture, rather
than on record evidence, are reversible.   See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir.2
2002).  Furthermore, we must uphold a determination regarding the availability of
      The IJ concluded that Michulena’s two marriages were “so fundamentally3
inconsistent with her claimed social group membership that it shatters her credibility
before the court.”  The BIA clarified that the IJ “did not simply conclude from the fact
that [Michulena] was twice-married that her claim to be a lesbian was not credible. 
Rather, it was the timing of [Michulena’s] testimony on behalf of her putative partner’s
successful application for asylum, her marriage to a United States citizen and pursuit of
adjustment of status, and then the reinstatement of her asylum claim based on sexual
orientation immediately after the marriage ended that cause the [IJ] to cite this as a
factor.”  We believe, however, that neither Machulena’s marriage nor the timing of her
relationships provide substantial evidence for concluding that she testified falsely
regarding her sexual orientation.  Michulena suggested that she was bi-sexual but that “I
think I’m more of a lesbian.”  Moreover, it appears that she married her Latvian husband
because he had raped her and she had become pregnant.  When asked “why you as a
lesbian decided to be married” in the United States, Michulena responded that she wanted
to “live a normal life” and have children. 
4
corroborating evidence unless “a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that
such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”  INA § 242(b)(4) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)];
see also Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2009). 
We agree with the Government that Michulena “does not challenge the lion’s share
of the agency’s adverse credibility determinations.”  We note, however, that several of
those determinations are suspect, particularly the conclusion that Michulena’s two
marriages and the timing of her personal relationships undermined her allegation that she
is a lesbian.   Importantly, though, Michulena admitted that she changed her testimony3
concerning the date of an attack so that her story would match a medical report in the
record.  In particular, Michulena stated in her asylum application that she and Timonina
were attacked on their way home from visiting friends in March 1998.  She testified,
however, that the attack occurred in October 1998, shortly before she traveled to the
      Michulena was also asked on cross-examination why a police document indicated4
that she reported a theft in December 1998.  A.R. 273, 707.  Michulena claimed that she
“submitted the complaint but my mother took that complaint [to the police] because I
[had] already left.”  A.R. 273. 
5
United States.  When asked on cross-examination about this discrepancy, Michulena
admitted that she corrected the date to October 1998 so that her testimony would
correspond to a medical report prepared by a Lativan doctor, which listed Michulena’s
“date of discharge” as October 27, 1998.  This admission adequately supports the adverse
credibility determination.  See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that “where an IJ’s finding of fabrication (supported by substantial evidence)
serves as the basis for discrediting other evidence, a reviewing court is in no position to
conclude that the discrediting of the remaining evidence is unsupported by substantial
evidence.”).
Michulena suggested that the March 1998 date provided in her asylum application
was a mistake, and that she only recognized this error after receiving the medical report. 
Accepting this argument, however, presents another significant inconsistency.  Michulena
testified that came to the United States on October 22, 1998.  When asked to explain why
the medical report listed her discharge date as October 27, 1998,  Michulena testified that4
the “date of discharge” was in fact the date the report was prepared in response to a
request made in connection with her asylum application.  Indeed, the date which appears
next to doctor’s signature is “27.10.98.”  Notably, though, Michulena testified at an
6earlier hearing that she did not decide to seek asylum until September 1999, so there
presumably would have been no reason to request the report in 1998.  Moreover,
Michulena’s explanation failed to account for the medical report’s indication that she was
“clobbered in the street . . . the last time on 17.10.98.”  A.R. 716.  In sum, we conclude
that the record contains substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding and
does not compel a contrary finding.
Michulena argues that the IJ and the BIA failed to consider her explanations for
the inconsistencies in the record.  She does not identify the explanations which were
allegedly ignored, and the IJ did indicate why Michulena’s explanations were insufficient
and noted where she provided no explanation.  Michulena also asserts that the IJ
“demanded too much” corroborative evidence.  We disagree.  The IJ reasonably required
Michulena to provide medical records and police reports related to specific treatment and
attacks, especially considering that she had furnished similar documents as part of her
application.  See Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2006).  Michulena
concedes “the medical evidence did not match exactly to the injuries that . . . [she] stated
occurred to her,” but contends that “there was no evidence that the injuries to which [she]
testified did not occur.”  Significantly, though, it is Michulena who carries the “ultimate
burden of persuasion in making an asylum claim.”  Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 349
(3d Cir. 2008).
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
